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ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INNOVATION:
THE HIDDEN COSTS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE
Jose Miguel Mendoza, * Christoph Van der Elst,
& Erik P. M Vermeulen
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, European policymakers
and academics are once again concerned with designing a regulatory
framework that protects investors from misbehavior by self-interested
managers and controlling shareholders. To be sure, no company ever
survived by ignoring the interests of other stakeholders such as
employees, customers and suppliers. The academic and policy debate,
however, focuses generally on the principal-agent relationship between
those with actual control of the firm and outside investors. This is
hardly surprising given the importance attributed to the idea that greater
effectiveness of common law legal systems in regulating agency
relationships, compared to their civil law (and mostly European)
counterparts, explains the success of Anglo-American capital markets.'
Visiting lecturer, Tilburg Law School and doctoral candidate at the
University of Oxford.
Professor of Business Law and Economics, Tilburg Law School and
Ghent University. Visiting Professor at the Torino University (CLEI) and the
College of Europe (Bruges).
Professor of Business Law, Tilburg Law School, Professor of Financial
Market Regulation, Tilburg Law & Economics Center, Visiting Professor,
Faculty of Law, Kyushu University, and Vice-President Corporate Legal
Department of Philips International B.V. (Corporate and Financial Law Group),
The Netherlands. The authors would like to thank the participants in the
roundtable meeting on Corporate Governance in listed companies organized by
the European Commission on 23 June 2010 (Brussels), the participants of the
European Association of Law and Economics Annual meeting on 24 September
2010 (Paris), the participants of the Insol Europe Annual Congress on 16
October 2010 (Vienna), and the participants of the Takeover Seminar organized
by the The Panel of Takeovers and Mergers, Central Chamber of Commerce of
Finland in Helsinki on 28 October 2010.
1 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997);
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta,
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Yet, civil law countries in Europe have sought to catch up with
common law systems during the past decade by implementing a vast
array of corporate governance reforms and takeover regulations.2
Arguably, these reforms were necessary to better protect "passive"
equity investors in listed companies, as asymmetric information and
collective action problems prevent close monitoring of firm
performance and enable controlling parties to tunnel assets and extract
profits from the company for their own interests.
The corporate governance reforms that followed in the wake of
the 2001-2002 corporate failures were initiated to alter, among other
things, the role of non-executive directors, disclosure, the internal and
external audit process, risk-management systems, and penalties for
managerial misconduct. Moreover, under the assumption that a market
for corporate control could be set in motion in Europe, a series of
takeover rules and regulations were introduced and fine-tuned to restore
investors' confidence in the integrity of capital markets and address
deficiencies in the relationship between the shareholders and managers
of listed companies. An active market for corporate control was
expected to align the interests of managers and public, often passive,
investors.4 Although it is acknowledged that many of these specific
corporate governance developments have created minimum standards
and guidelines that actually improved the functioning of listed
companies, it is far from clear whether more stringent and detailed
rules would have a similar effect. Still, policymakers and lawmakers
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Investor
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000).
2 John Armour, Simon Deakin, Prabirjit Sarkar, Mathias Siems & Ajit
Singh, Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical
Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 343 (2009).
To be sure, managerial abuses have been around for as long as widely-
dispersed investors poured their money into risky ventures, such as the Dutch
East India Company; and, as always, policymakers and lawmakers have
attempted to mitigate the underlying governance failures and errors. However,
corporate governance discussions have never been of this magnitude in both
academic and geographic sense. JOSEPH A. MCCAHERY & ERIK P. M.
VERMEULEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF NON-LISTED COMPANIES (Oxford
University Press, 2008).
4 It is widely assumed that a robust takeover market creates a powerful
incentive for managers to refrain from self-dealing transactions by providing a
constant and credible risk of hostile acquisitions. Jaap Winter, Corporate
Governance Regulation and Enforcement in the US and EU, in TOPICS IN
CORPORATE FINANCE: THE QUALITY OF CORPORATE LAW AND THE ROLE OF
CORPORATE LAW (Amsterdam Center for Corporate Finance, 2006).
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seem to believe that a more regulatory approach in the area of corporate
governance will only enhance the accountability of directors, managers
and controlling shareholders. Their efforts are based on the assumption
that these parties will better serve the interest of passive investors if
they embrace rules and regulations that offer them clear guidance about
the best way in which to discharge their duties to investors and other
stakeholders. To this effect, the argument that corporate governance
rules can clarify and supplement these duties has often been used to
support the idea that firms do not really bear high costs from reform
measures in this area.
Opponents of the regulatory view, who believe that corporate
governance should not be considered as a goal in itself, but rather as a
tool to improve firm performance, argue that corporate governance
initiatives are far too overreaching. 5 In fact, the current reform
movement has spawned many cumbersome rules that do not seem to
prevent corporate failures and, more importantly, appear to have a
relatively small effect on investment decisions.6 Unchecked, this
development could jeopardize entrepreneurship, innovation and long-
term economic growth.7 For instance, corporate governance regulations
have induced small firms to rethink their stock exchange listing.8 In this
respect, corporate governance rules and regulations act as an entry
barrier for high-potential companies. More troubling still is the notion
that stringent corporate governance rules and the stiff penalties for top
For a particularly interesting take on how the recent overreaching
corporate governance reforms tend to erode the competitiveness of US capital
markets, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance and U.S. Capital
Market Competitiveness (UCLA Working Paper, 2010).
6 Abe De Jong, Professor, Erasmus Univ. Rotterdam, Inaugural Lecture:
De Ratio van Corporate Governance (Oct. 6, 2006).
7 Pauline Skypala, Commentary, Managers' Lives Getting (a Bit) Harder,
FIN. TIMES (July 4, 2010, 09:27) http://www.ft.com/home/us (search "Financial
Times" for "Managers' Lives Skypala") ("There is a perceived danger that
regulation could be extended further, if codes prove ineffective. Mr Borges,
who is also chairman of the European Corporate Governance Institute, says
what is needed is better market discipline. Britain has probably the most
sophisticated corporate governance model in the world, yet companies
underperform for years and nothing happens to them. The same is true in
Euro e.").
Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric L. Talley, Going-Private
Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis,
USC CENTER L. (Economics & Organization Research Paper No. C06-5 RAND
Working Paper WR-300-1-ICJ, 2006).
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executives make start-up companies reluctant to use an initial public
offering (IPO) as a financing vehicle and arguably hamper the
performance and development of listed firms. Strict rules and
regulations encourage managers to seek high return on investment and
shareholder value, which eventually could lead to short-termism in the
boardroom and the adoption of an adversarial management style.9
Aside from these problems, corporate governance reforms can also
bring significant confusion to the market. Managers or controlling
parties could, for instance, adopt corporate governance measures to
conceal underperformance, thereby deceiving investors. According to
the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ), a rating system provided
by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Lehman Brothers Holdings
Inc. outperformed its peers by 87 percent.'o Its CGQ was better than 42
percent of the S&P 500 just a few days before its collapse.'' Of course,
advocates of more detailed regulation see the Lehman case as just
another example of why there is a need for policymakers and
lawmakers to develop more effective measures that prevent
opportunistic behavior in the corporate setting. However, the case could
also be made that Lehman merely demonstrates that there is no clear-
cut correlation between a "good" governance system on paper and firm
performance in practice. More detailed regulation, which arguably
encourages box-ticking and places more emphasis on the compliance
process, would only widen the gap between corporate governance on
paper and in practice.
In the wake of the most recent economic downturn, these
competing views have rekindled questions about the 'one-size-fits-all'
mentality of policymakers, lawmakers, rating agencies, and gatekeeper
institutions, and the alleged success of rules and regulations that can be
9 Symposium, CFA Centre for Financial Market Integrity & Business
Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics, Breaking the Short-Term Cycle:
Discussion and Recommendations on How Corporate Leaders, Asset
Mana ers, Investors, and Analysts Can Refocus on Long-Term Value (2006).
CGQ assesses the strengths, deficiencies and risks of a firm's corporate
governance system by looking at "(1) board of directors, (2) audit, (3) anti-
takeover provisions, [and] (4) executive and director compensation." Corporate
Governance Quotient (CGQ), YAHOO! FIN.,
http://help.yahoo.com/l/us/yahoo/finance/newsand-opinion/fitacgq.html (last
visited Oct. 22, 2010).
" Corporate Governance: Redefining Independence, GREENEWABLE'S
WEBLOG (Sept. 20, 2008), http://greenewable.wordpress.com/2008/09/20/
corporate-govemance-redefining-independance/.
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detrimental to the operation and development of listed companies. 12
The answers to these questions will most likely affect the current
reviews of corporate governance initiatives concerning listed firms.1 3
Despite awareness of the need to reign in misconduct, the media
attention regarding corporate scandals arguably discourages
policymakers from undertaking a deep enough study concerning the
effectiveness of new corporate governance initiatives. The case has
never been stronger for policymakers to rethink corporate governance
mechanisms and analyze the effect of the reforms undertaken over the
past decade. The goal of this paper is to understand the organizational
needs of listed companies and assess arguments for and against the
introduction of stricter corporate governance measures for publicly held
firms. Moreover, it suggests a legal framework that can have a positive
impact on firm performance and development.
In addressing which legal framework can enhance good
governance and improve the performance of listed companies across
the board, this paper distinguishes between different strands of reform
arising worldwide and addresses problems with the one-size-fits-all
approach. Section Two looks at the effect of takeover regulation in the
European Union (EU). It argues that although the market for corporate
control aligns the interests of managers and investors, a one-size-fits-all
approach may be inappropriate for most listed companies. In Section
Three, we canvass recent trends in corporate governance discussions.
Our analysis shows that the new wave of reforms can have a
detrimental effect on the innovative and entrepreneurial initiatives that
spur economic growth and job creation in a global context. Indeed, the
exemplars in Section Four show that corporate governance reforms are
often misguided and ill-informed. Section Five identifies alternative
legal mechanisms that could be employed by policymakers, lawmakers,
as well as courts in solving corporate governance problems in listed
companies and enhancing firm performance. Section Six concludes.
12 A New Idolatry, EcONOMIsT (Apr. 22, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/15954434 (noting that the economic crisis has
again started the discussion about a listed company's focus: should the interests
of shareholders, customers or workers prevail in the corporate governance
framework of a listed company). See also Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate
Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, FIN. MARKET TRENDS, Vol. 1
(OECD, July 2009), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/l/42229620.pdf
13 For instance, the European Commission plans to launch a broader
review of corporate governance, which may result in the publication of a green
paper.
6 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 7.1
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BusINEss
I. THE TREND TOwARDs FLEXIBLE TAKEOVER REGULATION
One of the most debated issues of the past decade involves the
mandatory enforcement of the 'one-share-one-vote' rule. 14 Under this
rule, a listed company must grant its shareholders an equal measure of
voting and cash flow rights. One-share-one-vote is commonly enforced
through limitations on the issuance of different classes of shares, such
as multiple voting shares, non-voting preferred stock, and similar
specimens. This restriction can take the form of absolute bans on dual-
class structures or, as is still the case in many countries, limits on the
percentage of shares with asymmetrical voting rights that can be issued
by a listed firm.' 5 The ultimate purpose of the one-share-one-vote rule
is (1) to reduce the incentives of controlling parties to expropriate
minority investors and (2) to stimulate the emergence of a market for
corporate control. One-share-one-vote seems to provide a simple and
effective way to accomplish these goals, making it the preferred recipe
of policymakers in both developed and emerging countries.' 6
Nevertheless, controlling parties have innumerable other ways of
separating voting and cash flow rights in listed firms, including
pyramid structures, cross-holdings, derivative products, and
shareholder coalitions.' 7 Absent an adjudicator that can determine
14 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Jose M Mendoza, The
Challenge of Disproportional Ownership, in READINGS IN LATIN AMERICAN
COMPANY LAW (F Reyes ed., University of Arizona, National Law Center for
Inter-American Free Trade 2011). Historical records also show that this issue
has been in vogue for quite some time. For an account on the one-share-one-
vote rule and the use of dual-class shares and pyramids in the US during the
19th and early 20th centuries. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One
Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30
CARDOZO L. REv. 445 (2008). Collen A. Dunlavy, Corporate Governance in
Late 19th-Century Europe and the US.: The Case of Shareholder Voting
Rights, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART
AND EMERGING RESEARCH (Klaus Hopt et al. eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press
1998).
15 Shearman & Sterling LLP, Proportionality Between Ownership and




16 Hayden and Bodie, supra note 14, at 480-83.
17 Avner Kalay & Shagun Pant, One Share-One Vote is Unenforceable
and Sub-optimal (NYU Stem Sch Bus.,Working Paper, 2008), available at
http://w4.stern.nyu.edulemplibrary/Kalay%20Pant%20-
%200ne%20share%20one%20vote.pdf.
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whether these other schemes are being used to circumvent one-share-
one-vote, this rule is usually unenforceable in practice.
In the context of takeovers in Europe, one-share-one-vote is
partially responsible for the creation of the breakthrough rule included
in the EU Takeover Bids Directive.' 8 The breakthrough rule endorses
the view that an offeror, upon the acquisition of 75% of the outstanding
share capital, can convene a general meeting of shareholders at short
notice with the purpose of eliminating any pre-bid defenses deployed
by the target firm. In this respect, the breakthrough rule imposes a one-
share-one-vote approach in offeree companies, which has been deemed
necessary to create a level playing field for takeover bids.19 In addition,
the Takeover Bids Directive also introduced the board neutrality rule to
create space for a European market for corporate control. Under this
rule, the management board of a target firm cannot thwart a successful
takeover bid by adopting post-bid defensive measures, such as poison
pills or issuing multiple voting shares to white knights, without the
approval from the general meeting of shareholders. 20 The breakthrough
and board neutrality rules attempt to prevent opportunistic behavior by
the parties in control of a listed firm. 21
The board neutrality and breakthrough rules sparked much
controversy among EU member states. For example, in the United
Kingdom one-share-one-vote is more accepted than in Sweden, where
it is common for companies to issue shares that carry multiple voting
rights.22 In order to strike a balance between views as opposite as these,
EU lawmakers adopted opt-in and opt-out provisions that allow
' Directive 2004/25/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 9, 10, 12.
19 Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Does the Takeover Bids
Directive Need Revision?, TILEC Discussion Paper 2010-006 (Feb. 4, 2010),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1 547861.
20 Directive 2004/25/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 8.
21 Id. The Takeover Bids Directive also contains other rules that are
designed to protect minority shareholders against opportunism on the part of
the offeror: (1) a mandatory bid rule that ensures that an offeror cannot obtain a
controlling stake without making a controlling bid; (2) disclosure rules
according to which the offeror must announce his intention to make an offer
and make public an offer document containing at least a minimum of
information; and (3) 'squeeze-out' and 'sell-out' rules that would have to be
implemented at a fair price.
22 DAvID KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT: TEXT AND MATERIALS
(Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
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member states to exempt companies from applying the board neutrality
and breakthrough rules. Under these provisions, companies can choose
to opt-in to the breakthrough rule regardless of the member states'
decision to implement the rule. Furthermore, member states may
reserve the right to opt-out of the implementation of the board
neutrality rule. The fact that most European jurisdictions already
required a board of directors to abstain from adopting defensive
measures without shareholders' prior approval explains why only a few
member states made use of this option. 23
Table 1 shows that the options approach in the Takeover Bids
Directive is appropriate when there are significant variations in firm
ownership and governance regimes across member states. 24 Some
might argue that the European Commission should encourage takeovers
by (1) making the provisions of the Takeover Bids Directive harder to
avoid and (2) creating new provisions to make corporate control more
contestable.25 In this view, takeovers are encouraged to discipline
managers and reallocate control.26 However, even if the Takeover Bids
Directive is imperfect in that it does allow suppression of takeover bid
activity, it arguably offers minimum standards of disclosure and
transparency that appear to have had a positive effect on the European
takeover market.27
23 Some member states, such as the Netherlands, had satisfactorily
addressed the board neutrality issue at the national level. McCahery &
Vermeulen, supra note 19, at 12-13.
24 Id. (table I at 14). See also Gerard Hertig & Joseph A. McCahery, A
Legal Options Approach to EC Company Law, in INVESTOR PROTECTION IN
EUROPE (G. Ferrarini ed. 2006) 15-17.
25 Luca Enriques, European Takeover Law: The Case for a Neutral
Approach (UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies,
Research Paper No. 24/2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1523307.
26 For instance, the reciprocity provision, which may apply in cases where
an offeror itself makes use of defensive measures, has led to new obstacles on
the European takeover market. See Commission of the European Communities
Report on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids, 8-9, Annex 1
at 12, SEC (2007) 268 (Feb 21, 2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2007-02-
report en.pdf. Annex 1 shows that member states explicitly opted into the
reciprocity provisions.
27 Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The Case Against
Reform of the Takeover Bids Directive, 22 EUR. Bus. L. REV. (forthcoming
2011). It is noteworthy that in the United Kingdom, which arguably has bidder-
friendly takeover regulation, the Takeover Panel recently proposed new rules
that protect target companies against hastily prepared takeover bids. Code
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Belgium No No X
Cyprus Yes No X (breakthrough)
Czech Republic Yes No
Denmark No No X (board neutrality)
Estonia Yes Yes
Finland Yes No
France Yes No X (board neutrality)
Germany No No X
Greece Yes No X
Hungary Yes No X
Ireland Yes No
Italy No No X
Latvia Yes Yes
Lithuania Yes Yes
Luxembourg No No X
Malta Yes No
The Netherlands No No X
Poland No No X
Conm., U.K. Panel on Takeovers & Mergers, Review of Certain Aspects of the
Regulation of Takeover Bids, PCP 2010/2, available at
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/2010-2.pdf.
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Board Breakthrough Reciprocity
Neutrality Rule
Portugal Yes No X
Slovakia Yes No
Slovenia Yes No X (board neutrality)
Spain Yes No X
Sweden Yes No X (breakthrough)
The United Yes No
Kingdom
Adapted from J. A. McCahery and Erik P. M Vermeulen, Does the
Takeover Bids Directive Need Revision?, in S. Grundmann et al.,
Festschrift fir Klaus J. Hopt zum 70. Geburtstag am 24. August 2010,
Unternehmen, Markt und Verantwortung, Band 2, De Gruyter, (2010)
12.28
The implementation and discussion of the provisions of the
Takeover Directive has strengthened shareholder rights and enforced
checks and balances within listed companies. Still, the Directive has
not yet sparked an active market for corporate control capable of
preventing misbehavior by managers and controlling parties. This has
prompted policymakers to embark on an even more ambitious agenda:
"strengthening" corporate governance frameworks. Under this strategy,
the refinement of transparency and investor protection rules is
prescribed to regulate relations between principals and agents. These
measures ultimately seek to promote long-term business success and
enhance investor confidence. In the next section, we evaluate and
compare the corporate governance frameworks that were introduced to
solve conflicts between controlling shareholders, managers, investors
and other stakeholders. We also provide an update of recent trends and
prospects in the fast-changing area of corporate governance.
28 See Commission of the European Communities, Report on the
Implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids, Commission Staff Working
Document, Brussels, SEC (2007) 268. Table I shows the popularity of the
Directive's opt out provisions. Member states that imposed the board neutrality
had already adopted a similar rule at national level. Most member states were
not familiar with the breakthrough rule, which explains its unpopularity.
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II. WHAT Do CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENTS TELL US?
A. WHY CARE ABOUT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?
The past years have seen unparalleled change in corporate
governance practices worldwide. Several finance scandals in the
beginning of this century provided new momentum for introducing
important legal and regulatory reforms. The scandals were not only
instrumental in moving corporate governance up the policy agenda, but
also in making it an integral part of the daily decision-making process
of listed firms. Corporate governance reforms emerging in the
aftermath of these scandals slowly settled in the global business
environment creating a new set of minimum governance standards.
Although the corporate governance movement necessarily raised firm's
awareness of the decision-making process and internal control
mechanisms, it never evolved much more beyond an exercise in "box-
ticking."
Consequently, when analyzing different corporate governance
approaches, it is necessary to be aware that underperforming companies
may have a financial incentive to mislead the market by focusing on
good governance instead of growth, performance and innovation. This
is best illustrated by the use of "precatory signals" that can deceive
investors into believing that the insiders of a firm are willing to restrain
their diversionary activities. Precatory signals are those that are not tied
to effective commitments to reduce expropriation by managers or
controlling parties.30 In many cases, firms that adopt corporate
governance codes and measures of best practice ostensibly restrict the
opportunistic activities of controlling parties. Whilst the controlling
parties in listed firms will not bear significant costs by following
standard corporate governance arrangements, there may be
considerable financial rewards in their adoption if investors are willing
to pay a premium for shares of allegedly "well-govemed" companies.
The U.S. automotive industry provides an example of deceiving
appearances.' While General Motor's (GM) corporate governance
29 Dennis C. Carey & Michael Patsalos-Fox, Shaping Strategy from the
Boardroom, 3 McKINSEY Q. 90-94 (2006), available at
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com.
30 John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation,
149 U. PA. L.R. 2151, 2175 (2001).
31 See generally Robert A. G. Monks & Nell Minow, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (Wiley, 2008).
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model failed to raise any alarms about the firm's success, Ford's
management structure was often considered to be a disaster with
respect to enhancing shareholder value. 32 For instance, multiple-voting
shares Class B gave the Ford family-with 31 votes for every share-
40% of the voting power with less than 40% of the equity.33 This
undemocratic governance structure was made worse by the Ford
family's veto power over any resolution impacting the firm's corporate
structure.34 It must have come as a surprise to corporate governance
advocates that Ford's internal organization was effective not only in
detecting problems in the business model, but also in taking timely
action to remedy them.35 Conversely, the recent GM bailout was caused
in part because problems were denied and solutions delayed, despite
36
GM's alleged commitment to a proper corporate governance system.
These contrasting examples support the view that "sound" corporate
governance on paper does not guarantee firm growth and value.
37
It is argued that if managers use "good" governance statements
opportunistically to conceal performance it is only because
32 Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How Do Family Ownership,
Control, and Management Affect Firm Value?, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 385 (2006).
3 Ford Motor Company, 2008 Annual Report, available at
http://corporate.ford.com/microsites/annual-reports.
34 Paul Ingrassia, The Lessons of the GM Bankruptcy, WALL STREET J.
(June 1, 2010). See also Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, Family Control of
Firms and Industries, FIN. MGMT 863 (2010).
35 Problems and successes in the automotive industry are often linked to
corporate governance issues. For example, Toyota's safety crisis is largely
attributed to corporate governance failures. It's assumed that its traditional
board, which is large and hierarchical, would not be able to deal adequately
with internal and external changes. Surprisingly, however, its position as a
global market leader could be overtaken by Volkswagen, which was recently
involved in one of the biggest German corruption scandals ever. The scandals
have not initiated change in the governance structure of Volkswagen. It remains
to be managed by a cozy network of workers, politicians and executives
(despite increasing criticism corporate governance proponents). See Daniel
Schafer, VW- Protective Layers, FIN. TIMES (June 17, 2010, 9:33 PM),
http://www.ft.com/home/us (search "Financial Times" for "Schdfer, VW:
Protective Layers"); see also Bruce Aronson, Learning from Toyota's Troubles
- Where's the Board?, JURIsT (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.jurist.org/forumy/
2010/02/learning-from-toyotas-troubles-wheres.php.
36 See Ingrassia, supra note 34.
3 N.K. Chidambaran, Darius Palia & Yudan Zheng, Does Better
Corporate Governance "Cause" Better Firm Performance, (2006) (on file
with authors).
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shareholders have failed to act as "responsible owners."38 To be sure,
investors have increasingly cast their votes at the annual general
meetings of their portfolio companies. 39 The emergence of electronic
proxy and voting platforms provided necessary impetus to solve
complex and cumbersome voting procedures. 40 Proxy services firms
assist listed multinationals in communicating with shareholders by
distributing electronic proxy agendas to institutional investors and
collecting and processing votes for the annual general meeting of
shareholders. Activist investors, such as hedge funds, have increasingly
engaged portfolio companies directly to demand changes or
improvements in the governance structure of a firm. 41 These active
investors often contact a portfolio company's management to seek
financial information or to influence decision-making and disclosure.
This increased level of involvement can lead to by mergers and
reorganizations, increased leverage, dividend recapitalizations, and the
replacement of management and board members. Activism by hedge
funds has even been regarded as the driving force behind the next
corporate governance revolution. Yet, even though activist shareholders
have the potential to impose discipline on boards and managers, these
equity funds are mostly shrouded in mystery, obscurity and complexity.
In addition, these funds are said to neglect long-term goals and
pursuing short-term pay-offs. 42 There now seems to be some consensus
among policymakers about the need for responsible long-term investors
instead of short-term activists. Institutional investors and large
shareholders are under a growing pressure from'official agencies and
other networks, such as the Financial Reporting Council in the United
38 Kate Burgess & Miles Johnson, FRC Offers Blueprint for Investor
Engagement, FIN. TIMES (July 1, 2010, 22:56), http://www.ft.com/home/us
(search "Financial Times" for "FRC Offers Blueprint Burgess");.
39 See Section IV.B for a more detailed discussion on the behavior of
shareholders during the general meeting.
4 Michael C. Schouten, The Political Economy of Cross-Border Voting in
Europe, 16 COL. J. EUR. L. 1 (2009).
41 Janet H. Marler & Christophe Faug6re, Shareholder Activism and
Middle Management Equity Incentives, 18 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN
INTERNATIONAL REVIEw 313 (2010) (defining shareholder activism as a range
of actions taken by shareholders to influence corporate management and
boards).
42 Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Private Equity and
Hedge Funds Activism: Explaining the Diferences in Regulatory Responses, 9
EUR. Bus. ORG. L. R. 535 (2008).
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Kingdom and the International Corporate Governance Network, to
become actively engaged in their portfolio companies.43
The above discussion offers a brief glimpse of some past trends
in corporate governance. The picture that emerges is one of
ambivalence. Policymakers and lawmakers introduced "sensible" rules
and best practices that, with the possible exception of minimum
standards geared towards improving business performance, may
sometimes have lead to unexpected results. On the one hand,
companies may adopt a corporate governance framework that leads
them astray because they (and their advisors) are merely engaged in
box-ticking to satisfy auditors, analysts, and other financial market
watchdogs. On the other hand, companies can opportunistically adhere
to "high standards" of governance to signal trustworthiness to the
market without a concurrent internal commitment toward improving
value. The bottom line, in our view, is that introducing more detailed
corporate governance regulation on a one-size-fits-all and ad-hoc basis
is less desirable than a flexible principle-based framework. Stricter
rules and less flexibility arguably result in higher compliance costs and
more box-ticking. Moreover, without empirical research it is hard to
predict whether imposing more detailed rules on firms will prevent
fraud, let alone an economic downturn. Section IV contains several
exemplars to illustrate that the introduction of stricter corporate
governance regulation, based mostly on intuitive hunches, can have a
negative spill-over effect on the performance and development of
firms. Since companies have different corporate governance needs
depending on the culture and other firm-specific features such as size,
scope, and firm-ownership, it is difficult to make a case for the
introduction of more generally defined corporate governance rules.44
This can be seen in the most recent trend in corporate governance, as
explained below.
43 International Corporate Governance Network, ICGN STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES ON INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER RESPONSIBILITIES (2010),
available at http://www.icgn.org/files/icgn main/pdfs/best practice/instshare
responsibilities/2007_principles on institutional shareholder responsibilities.
pdf.
4 Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson de Carvalho & Erica Gorga,
Corporate Governance in Brazil, Northwestern University Law and Economics
Research Paper No. 09-18 (2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-l 152454.
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B. CONVERGENCE OR DIVERSITY IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS
The corporate governance framework of listed companies is
drawn, roughly, from three different sources. The primary source is
corporate law; the second, securities regulation; and the third is codes
of best practice and guidelines. 45 This framework is concerned with
similar issues across jurisdictions: (1) an active and fair protection of
the rights of all shareholders, (2) an accountable management board
and effective monitoring mechanisms, and (3) transparent information
about the financial and non-financial position of the firm.46
In the United States, each state has its own corporate law
governing the companies that incorporate in that state.41 Most listed
companies incorporate in Delaware due to the modern, flexible and
effective nature of its legal framework.4 8 Delaware General
Corporation Law grants shareholders a say on the most important
corporate matters, such as significant mergers and acquisitions,
amending the articles of association, and electing directors. Since a
significant part of Delaware's corporate law mainly consists of default
rules, firms are given latitude to establish specific corporate governance
features in their articles or by-laws, such as designating classes of
securities, authorizing securities with different voting rights, and the
mode of appointing directors. Two broad fiduciary duties offer an ex-
45 These codes do not intend to enshrine absolute principles and norms,
but merely offer a recommendation. In this respect, they serve several
functions: (1) they provide business participants with recommended solutions
to compliment corporate law rules and securities regulations; (2) they provide
focal point solutions to corporate governance problems; and (3) they are meant
to assist business parties in the interpretation and implementation of good
governance practices. Paul Coombes and Simon. Chiu-Yin Wong, Why Codes
of Governance Work, 2 THE MCKINSEY Q. 48-53 (2004), available at
www.mckinseyquarterly.com.
46 Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The Role of the Law in Developing Efficient
Corporate Governance Frameworks, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF NON-
LISTED COMPANIES IN EMERGING MARKETS (OECD 2006).
47 Securities exchanges, through their listing rules, impose additional
mandates. The New York Stock Exchange, for instance, requires that the
majority of the directors are independent.
48 63% of the Fortune 500 companies are incorporated under the Delaware
General Corporation Law. See Del. Div. of Corps., 2009 Annual Report,
available at http://corp.delaware.gov/. In this article, we focus on the Delaware
General Corporation Law, since the statutes and its interpretation are influential
in other states.
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post mechanism to fill gaps in the corporate articles or by-laws. The
duty of care requires board members to perform their duties as a
prudent person in comparable situations under similar circumstances,
and the duty of loyalty requires board members to act in good faith and
in the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders.49
Statutory corporate law in continental Europe (and most other
civil law jurisdictions) lacks the flexibility of Delaware law.50
Relationships between shareholders and management are primarily
governed by the articles of association and the law of European civil
law countries. In contrast to Delaware General Corporation Law, these
corporate laws are more mandatory in nature in that parties have no
option but to conform to the corporate law rules.51 The involvement of
the European legislature in developing a harmonization program
designed to create a degree of uniformity in the law regarding creditor
and investor protection through the EU has arguably tended to restrict
flexibility in corporation law in general.52 Incorporation formalities and
capital requirements abound in order to protect shareholders and
creditors. Furthermore, firms are required to disclose deviations from
default rules, including capital structure, objectives, the system of
voting, supervision, and conduct governing general shareholder
meetings, in filed articles of incorporation.
In 2002, the U.S. adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which
imposed new independence obligations and restrictions on directors
and required internal control mechanisms to restore investor
confidence. 54 Upon adopting the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act, U.S.
corporate law became more mandatory in nature, giving listed U.S.
firms less room to maneuver around existing corporate law rules.55
49 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
5o Katharina Pistor, Yorman Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D.
West, Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 J. OF COMP. ECON. 676 (2003).
5' Reinier Kraakman et al, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2d ed. 2009).
52 Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Does the European
Company Prevent the "Delaware Effect?," in EUROPEAN CORPORATE
GOvERNANCE, READINGS AND PERSPECTIVES (Thomas Clarke & Jean-Francois
Chanlat eds., 2009).
s3 Erik P. M. Vermeulen, THE EVOLUTION OF LEGAL BUSINESS FORMS IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: VENTURE CAPITAL, JOINT VENTURE AND
PARTNERSHIP STRUCTURE (2003).
54 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
5 Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, THE SARBANES OXLEY DEBACLE:
WHAT WE'VE LEARNED; How To FIX IT (2006).
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Sarbanes-Oxley strongly influenced the development of corporate
governance in European and Asian-Pacific markets, leading to the
emergence of corporate governance codes. 6 Contrary to the provisions
of Sarbanes-Oxley, these codes allegedly offered greater flexibility by
following the comply-or-explain rule. Firms should adopt and comply
with the boilerplate and standardized provisions of the codes or explain
non-compliance. Thus, comply-or-explain gives companies the
necessary room to maneuver. It also provides policymakers with more
leeway when adjusting codes to meet changing social and economic
circumstances. This view is supported by the fact that the drafters of
corporate governance codes have been actively introducing, revising
and updating these codes since the accounting scandals at the beginning
of the century (see Figure 1).




56 Paul U. Ali & Greg N. Gregoriou, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY (2006); See also AFTER ENRON:
IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES REGULATION IN
EUROPE AND THE US (John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2006).
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Even though there is wide consensus among European
policymakers that the flexibility of codes prevails over inflexible, hard
law rules and regulations,57 firms tend to adopt and comply with the
boilerplate and standardized provisions of the codes rather than
explain-even though more optimal-non-compliance. In fact, since
the principle-based best practices framework tends to be overly detailed
and complex,59 companies often find it difficult to deviate from the
codes.60 It is therefore fair to say that the comply-or-explain approach
has encouraged companies to abide by the "letter" of the code,
emphasizing the mandatory nature of corporate law in Europe.
It is only to be expected that the recent global financial crisis will
lead to more mandatory rules and convergence in the corporate
governance systems around the globe. Policymakers and lawmakers on
both sides of the Atlantic are starting to focus once again on tightening
corporate law rules and enacting best-practice provisions to protect
investors and creditors. Similar to previous financial crises, visible
market failures and perceived corruption sparked public outrage that
has forced the hand of legislators in the United States and the European
Union.6 We can distinguish five emerging regulatory responses. First,
the crisis gave new life to some old debates on the internal governance
of listed firms, primarily on the topic of heightened board
independence. The independence of prospective candidates to the board
is traditionally determined by reference to a ready-made checklist
5 Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the
Council Concerning Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate
Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003)
284 final (May 21, 2003).
5 Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Corporate Governance
Crises and Related Party Transactions: A Post-Parmalat Agenda, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, STATES, AND MARKETS
IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE US 215 (Klaus J. Hopt, Eddy Wymeersch, Hideki
Kanda & Harald Baum eds., 2005).
S9 Principle-based codes emphasize the need to foster standardization and
awareness. The drafting committees of the corporate governance codes consist
mainly of experienced individuals (making best practice principles more
accessible to customization). Yet, experts cannot always be viewed as
disinterested persons. They may have political or other agendas, only
tangentially related to encouraging business growth and innovation.
60 Sridhar Arcot, Valentino Bruno & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Corporate
Governance in the U.K.: Is the Comply or Explain Approach Working?, 30
INT'L REv. L. & EcON. 193 (2010).
61 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance and U.S. Capital
Market Competitiveness, (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No.
10-13, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1696303.
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included in the bylaws or in codes of good practice, without any real
scrutiny about other critical qualities such as experience, knowledge,
and diligence. The shortcomings of these checklists have in the past
facilitated the appointment of directors who were only ostensibly
independent. 62 Presently, policy makers are in the process of designing
better bright-line rules, which should ideally ensure the independence
of prospective candidates to the board, as well as their commitment and
expertise. 63
The second item on the law reform agenda is executive
compensation. There are a number of general principles that lawmakers
have used to draft proposals to mitigate excessive compensation and
curtail the opportunistic behavior of managers: (1) compensation
should be based on measurable performance objectives, and (2) the
decision-making process regarding compensation schemes should be
more transparent (see Table 2). The latter principle has led U.S.
lawmakers to consider measures to increase the involvement of
shareholders and even workers in determining executive compensation,
the so-called "say-on-pay" provision. After much deliberation, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) decided on January 25,
2011 to give shareholders the right to participate in the process of
setting the compensation levels of management.6 The say-on-pay
approach has its roots in Europe, where a number of reforms in this
62 Listed companies in Japan are not obligated to appoint independent
directors. Generally, Japanese firms believe there is no place for outsiders in
supervising a domestic company. The evidence provided by the sparse
examples of outside directors in Japan is inconclusive regarding a possible
correlation between independence and firm performance and value. In Seiko,
the influence of an outside director proved decisive in solving a time-
consuming and costly conflict in the boardroom. Fujitsu shareholders have a
different story. Independent' directors were unable to stop a conflict between
board members that seriously affected Fujitsu's share price. Jonathan Soble,
How Seiko Dissidents Called Time, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2010, 22:11),
http://www.ft.com/home/us (search "Financial Times" for "Seiko Soble").
63 European Commission Staff, Corporate Governance in Finacial
Institutions: Lessons to be Drawn from the Current Financial Crisis, Best
Practices (European Commission Staff Working Document, COM (2010) 284
final.
6 The new SEC rules implement Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and add Section 14A to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay and Golden Parachute
Compensation as Required Under Dodd-Frank Act (Jan. 25, 2011)
http://sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm.
20 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 7.1
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS
field were already introduced in response to the corporate governance
scandals of the beginning of this century. In the United Kingdom, for
instance, the shareholders of listed firms have an advisory vote on the
remuneration report issued by the company.65 In the Netherlands,
Norway and Sweden, it is required to obtain a binding shareholder
approval for the executive remuneration policy.66 Jurisdictions are also
increasingly inclined to mandate compensation committees to review
executive compensation separate from and in addition to audit
committees and nominating committees that also have power over
aspects of executive oversight.67
Table 2: Executive compensation
Country Rule
U.S., Disclosure of salaries for the CEO, CFO and the three
Canada next highest paid executives
Britain,
Germany, Disclosure of salaries for all executives
France
Finland, Disclosure of CEO salary
Sweden
Old rule: Disclosure of total pay to all executives.
Individual amounts not disclosed.
Japan New rule (31 March 2010): Disclosure of salaries of
more than 100 Million Yen
Source: adaptedfrom The Daily Yomiuri, June 12, 2010.
Even if these proposed compensation rules follow global trends,
they might not provide a definitive solution to the problems caused by
excessive pay of executives in underperforming firms. The proposed
rules could prove impractical by protracting and complicating the
decision-making process with listed firms. For example, it may be
difficult for shareholders to respond to proposed salaries with informed
65 Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO
Compensation: Evidence from the UK (Mar. 11, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1420394.
66 Jie Cai & Ralph A. Walkling, Shareholders'Say on Pay: Does it Create
Value? (Drexel Coll. of Bus., Research Paper No. 2008-06), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1030925.
67 Guido Ferrarini, Niamh Moloney & Maria Cristina Ungureanu,
Understanding Directors' Pay in Europe: A Comparative and Empirical
Analysis (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 126/2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1418463.
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and meaningful criticism. Executive pay schemes are complex, often
linked to both financial and non-financial targets. Moreover, even
though the disclosure of executive salaries is supposed to restrict
excessively high salaries, it may in practice have the opposite effect. In
Japan, for instance, the salary disclosure rule required companies to
reveal the total aggregate pay of all the executives in a company.6 On
March 31, 2010, an additional requirement became effective requiring
disclosure of individual annual salaries that exceed 100 million Yen
(approximately US$ 1.1 million). It would not be surprising if this rule
69eventually leads to higher pay levels in Japan, which have
traditionally been lower than the executive salaries in the United States
and Europe, but have already more than doubled over the last ten
years.70 In 2009, less than 300 executives of 3,813 companies listed at
Japanese stock exchanges had to disclose their salary.71 The average
salary of a CEO in Japan is US$ 580,000. However, the non-Japanese
CEOs of Nissan Corp. and Sony Corp. crushed the expectations of
observers that their salary would not exceed US and European levels.
Both men received 890 million Yen (US$9.8 million) and 816.5 million
Yen (US$9 million), respectively, which is considerably higher than the
average CEO pay of US$ 3.5 million at listed companies in the United
States.72 The expectation is that the gap between the salary levels of
non-Japanese and Japanese executives will disappear with the new
68 Michiyo Nakamoto, Japan Turns Spotlight on Executive Pay, FIN.
TIMES (June 10, 2010, 19:29), http://www.ft.com/home/us (search "Financial
Times" for "Japan Turns Spotlight on Executive Pay Nakamoto").
6 Japanese Executive Pay: Spartan Salarymen, ECONOMIST: NEWSBOOK
(June 30, 2010, 17:05), http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/06/
japanese-executivepay (concluding that Japanese firms should offer more
generous incentives to reward talent and effort).
70 Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Executive
Compensation in Japan: Estimating Levels and Determinants from Tax, 20 J.
EcoN. & MGMT STRATEGY (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3-4), available at
http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/nakazato-ramseyer-rasmusen-exec.pdf
71 Jason Clenfield, In Japan, Underpaid-and Loving It, BLOOMBERG:
BUSINESSWEEK, July 1, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/
10_28/b4186014341924.htm.
72 Yoshio Takahashi, Nissan CEO Made $9.8 Million, WALL ST. J., June
23, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704853404575323
780460252438.html.
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disclosure rules,7 3 putting more emphasis on compensation as a driver
to enhance firm performance.74
As previously mentioned, some EU Member States have also
focused on a third trend: encouraging shareholders to be more
responsible and active in preventing misbehavior and excessive risk-
taking by the firm's insiders. The best example of this approach is the
U.K.'s Stewardship Code prepared by the Financial Reporting Council
in July 2010,7s which contains recommendations to help institutional
investors better exercise their rights as shareholders of listed firms. 7 6
This Code appears to be contributing to efforts to rebuild trust in the
financial sector in light of the fact that sixty-eight institutions have
already published statements of support less than six months after its
publication. However, it seems too early to predict with certainty
whether the adherence to this code will encourage long-term growth.
The question arises, for instance, whether institutional investors should
be actively engaged with investee companies if they lack the time,
knowledge, and a financial incentive to do so. 78 Further complicating
73 Executive compensation levels of Japanese executives are viewed as a
historical and cultural legacy of Japanese corporations. In Japan, salary was
generally viewed as a cost compensation mechanism and not as a performance
driver. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Japan's Executives to Reveal Compensation
Under New Rules, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748703890904575296390830444072.html.
74 See e.g., Executive Pay on the Rise at Top Japanese Firms, ASAHI
SHIMBUN, July 27, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/english/
TKY20100726041 0.html.
75 The U.K. Stewardship Code, FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, available
at http://www.frc.org.uk.
76 These principles can be described as follows: (1) Institutional investors
are prompted to disclose their engagement policy regarding monitoring,
intervening, and voting; (2) a conflict of interest policy is available; (3)
institutional investors actively monitor investee companies (e.g., they attend
shareholder meetings); (4) institutional investors have an escalation procedure
that sets out the circumstances under which they actively intervene in a listed
company; (5) if necessary institutional investors act in concert; (6) a policy on
voting and disclosure of voting activity is available; and (7) a periodical report
informs the market of the stewardship activities, such as voting.
n U.K. Stewardship Code Statements, FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL,
available at http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/stewardshipstatements.cfm.
78 Anthony Goodman, Investors Should be Careful What They Wish for,
FIN. TIMES (July 5, 2010, 18:34) http://www.ft.com/home/us (search "Financial
Times" for "Investors Should be Careful Goodman"). However, it has been
argued that the Stewardship Code is "unlikely to foster substantially greater
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matters is the fact that institutional investors owe a fiduciary duty to
their own investors which may conflict with corporate governance
policies of the investee companies.
A fourth fashionable topic doing the rounds in corporate
governance circles is gender parity in the boardroom. Traditionally,
women have been underrepresented in the higher managerial echelons
of listed firms. A recent report found that amongst Fortune 500 firms
only 15.2 percent of all directors are women.7 9 The situation in the
European Union and elsewhere is similar.8 0 Policymakers across the
globe have taken notice and are now attempting to close the boardroom
gender gap. Gender parity initiatives are already in effect in Australia,
France, Norway, and Spain with different degrees of success. An initial
examination of the relationship between board composition and firm
performance shows that diverse boards enhance firm performance.8 1
Furthermore, gender diversification positively affects corporate social
responsibility ratings, which in turn improves the reputation of a
company.82 Some authors have argued, however, that board diversity
may restrict the ability of firms to adapt to changing business
circumstances. In sum, the research conducted so far does not provide
a clear-cut answer to the question of whether gender and ethnic
diversity has a positive, neutral, or negative impact on firm
performance.84 Before measures mandating board diversity are
shareholder investment in U.K. corporate governance." Brian R. Cheffins, The
Stewardship Code's Achilles'Heel, 73 MODERN L. REv. 1004 (2010).
7 Catalyst, Census of Women Board Directors of the Fortune 500 (2008),
available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/242/08_census wbd jan.pdf.
80 See, e.g., Charlotte Viliers, Achieving Gender Balance in the
Boardroom: Is it Time for Legislative Action in the UK?, 30 LEGAL STUDIES
533 (2010); Siri Terjesen et al., Women Directors on Corporate Boards: A
Review and Research Agenda, 17 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REV.
320 (2009), available at http://www.som.cranfield.ac.uk/som/dinamic-
content/media/documents/CGIR.pdf.
81 Melsa Ararat, Mine H. Aksu & Ayse Tansel Cetin, The Impact ofBoard
Diversity on Boards' Monitoring Intensity and Firm Performance: Evidence
from the Istanbul Stock Exchange (April 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1572283.
82 Stephen Bear, Noushi Rahman & Corinne Post, The Impact of Board
Diversity and Gender Composition on Corporate Social Responsibility and
Firm Reputation, 97 J. OF Bus. ETHICs 207 (2010).
83 Jerry Goodstein, Kanak Gautam & Warren Boeker, The Effects ofBoard
Size and Diversity on Strategic Change, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT J. 241 (1994).
8 David A. Carter et al., The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of U.S. Boards
and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance, 18 CORP.
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introduced at a European level, further empirical research is
warranted.
Finally, the fifth trend followed by policymakers and lawmakers
requires training and coaching for executive and non-executive board
members. Even though these soft techniques may sometimes prove
effective deterrents for some high-risk strategies pursued by certain
executives, they are unlikely, in the long run, to form the basis of a
coherent and effective corporate governance regime that provide
executives and managers with sufficient incentives while protecting the
interests of passive investors and other stakeholders.
In the next section, we will show that extended and detailed
corporate governance rules and regulations, which are based on a one-
size-fits-all approach and encourage box-ticking, may actually lead to
higher net costs for companies and their stakeholders. We will
challenge the one-size-fits-all mentality of policyrnakers by describing
three exemplars illustrating the negative effects of more detailed
measures, and argue that the effect of corporate governance rules on
listed companies should be further examined before engaging
policymakers and lawmakers to implement inappropriate measures too
forcibly and hastily.
III. THE CASE AGAINST ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE RULES
A. EXEMPLAR 1: HIGH GROWTH COMPANIES
The first exemplar frames our view that the strengthening of
corporate governance rules, which is high on Europe's political agenda,
/ 86
may have a detrimental effect on firm development and performance.
If this holds true, there is a perceived danger that Europe's drive for
more corporate governance regulation will eventually jeopardize
entrepreneurship and job creation. European policyrnakers have
committed themselves to create an environment in which high-potential
GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REv. 396 (2010) (showing there is no significant
relationship between gender or ethnic diversity of the board and firm
performance); Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom
and Their Impact on Governance and Performance, 94 J. OF FIN. ECON. 291
(2009).
85 Some authors have even expressed "an urgent need for more scholarship
in this field." See Terjesen et al.,supra note 80.
86 See supra Section I.
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growth companies are able to flourish into large, world-leading
companies in a relatively short period of time.87 This is important,
especially in dealing with the lingering consequences of the economic
downturn as listed high growth companies contribute
disproportionately to the creation of jobs and wealth. In this respect, it
is interesting to see that when we compare the ranking of the world's
largest companies in the Financial Times Global 500 list (see Figure
2),89 the number of relatively young listed high-growth companies in
the United States is remarkable, (2) U.S. high-growth companies
dominate the top 100 of the ranking, and (3) starting (or moving) a
high-growth company into the United States seems to increase the
chances of success.90 Table 3, which compiles data from the U.K.'s
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, shows that the United
States indeed has more listed high-growth companies than the United
Kingdom.
87 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions, Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative, Innovation Union, COM (2010)
546 final, Brussels, June 10, 2010. The Innovation Union is one of the seven
flagship initiatives defined by the European Commission in its Europe 2020
Strategy. There are seven flagship initiatives: (1) Innovation Union, (2) Youth
on the move, (3) A digital agenda for Europe, (4) Resource efficient Europe,
(5) An industrial policy for the globalization era, (6) An agenda for new skills
and jobs, and (7) European platform against poverty.
88 High Growth Firms in the UK: Lessons from an Analysis of
Comparative UK Performance (Dep't for Bus. Enter. & Regulatory Reform,
BERR Econ. Paper No. 3, Nov. 2008), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/
file49042.pdf.
89 Please note we have excluded energy, oil and gas producers, and
financial institutions from our research.
90 Ashlee Vance, Shapeways and Its 3-D Printing Comes to New York,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2010, 5:53 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/
23/shapeways-and-its-3-d-printing-comes-to-new-york/?ref-technology. This
is also exemplified by the recent move of Shapeways, which is a spin-off
company of Royal Philips Electronics in the Netherlands, to New York. After
Shapeways secured a $5 million investment from Union Square Ventures, a
New York Venture Capital Fund, and London-based Index Ventures, the high-
growth company reincorporated as a Delaware corporation in the United States.
Besides business considerations, the flexibility and stability in corporate
governance also played a role in making the reincorporation decision.
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One might wonder why Europe is lagging behind in terms of the
creation of listed high-growth companies. The answer is of course not
straightforward and depends on factors such as the access to capital, the
entrepreneurial mindset, the existence of networks and relationships,
and the experience of intermediaries. 91 Yet, the availability of the
Delaware corporate form that combines strong management and control
characteristics with contractual flexibility also plays a pivotal role in
the emergence of listed high-growth companies. 92 The flexibility and
91 Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital Beyond
the Financial Crisis: How Corporate Venturing Boosts New Entrepreneurial
Clusters (and Assists Governments in Their Innovation Efforts), 5 CAPITAL
MARKETs L. J. 471 (2010).
92 The National Venture Capital Association has posted model legal
documents on its website. The model certificate of incorporation is set up for a
company incorporated in Delaware. Delaware corporate law is preferred for
four reasons: (1) it offers a modem and internationally recognized statute, (2) it
offers a well-developed body of case law, (3) the Delaware Court of
Chancery's understanding of running a business, and (4) the user-friendly
Secretary of State. Model Legal Documents, NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL Ass'N,
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?optionrcom content&view-article&id=1 08:m
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stability of the Delaware General Corporation Law allows managers-
often the entrepreneurial founders-and shareholders to set up an
organizational structure that best meets their special business needs as a
growth company.
Table 3: Large listed high growth firms in the US and the UK
UK US (2007) UK US (2006)
(2007) (2006)
Number of





- * Google -
companies less NII Holdings
than 10 yrs old
a Google
- * Cognizant - Google
Technology Cognizant
Numberofhigh Solutions Technology
growth l Netapp Solutions
companies less Amazon.com elay
than 15 yrs oldWetmYho
a Western >Yahoo!
Refining. NII holdings
is NII holdings ____
Source: Adapted from Department for Business Enterprise &
Regulatory Reform, High growth firms in the UK: Lessons from an
analysis of comparative UK performance, BERR Economics Paper No.
3, November 2008.
The importance of flexibility for high-growth companies is
illustrated by the data that show how the migration of U.S. growth
companies gained pace after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act allegedly imposed
stiff legal requirements on corporations listed on a U.S. stock exchange,
particularly with regard to their auditing processes. A study published
in 2008 includes evidence suggesting that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act had
9 See supra Section III.B; see also Richard Waters, Why Tech Companies
Need the Discipline of a Dividend, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010, 20:30),
http://www.ft.com/home/us (search "Financial Times" for "Why Tech
Companies Need the Discipline Waters").
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disproportionately affected small U.S. publicly-held firms. 94 Because
significant costs were imposed on companies that intended to float their
shares on U.S. capital markets, some of these firms decided to use other
listing venues, such as the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in
London, which features principle-based rules that allow firms to tailor
listing requirements to their needs. The decision by U.S. firms to quote
on AIM enhanced the reputation of this market venue and led
companies from other jurisdictions to seek AIM listings. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act also spurred some directors and managers to consider going-
private (see Figure 3).
94 Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric Talley, Sarbanes-Oxley and
Small Firms: What is the Evidence? in IN THE NAME OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP?:
THE LOGIC AND EFFECTS OF SPECIAL REGULATORY TREATMENT FOR SMALL
BUSINEss (Susan M. Gates & Kristin Leuschner eds., 2008).
9 The average costs of being public in the U.S. for companies with annual
revenue under $1 billion before the reform amounted to approximately
$1,052,000. In 2002, the costs increased by 80% (to an estimated amount of
$1,891,000). In 2005, the average costs dropped by 16% from $3,437,000
(2004) to $2,881,000 (2005). Thomas E. Hartman & Foley & Lardner LLP, The
Cost of Being Public in the Era of Sarbanes-Oxley 2006, available at
http://www.foley.com/files/tbls3 1Publications/FileUploadl37/3420/ndi%2020
06%20public%20study/o2OFINAL.pdf. Note that delisting is not always a
pragmatic reaction despite the high costs attached to implementation of
corporate governance measures. Although the rules for delisting vary among
stock exchanges, exorbitant costs and regulatory restrictions prevent firms
across the board from taking the delisting step. For instance, on the New York
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, the delisting process is only set in motion
when a minimum on firm size, price, publicly held shares, number of
shareholders, and trading volume has been reached; thereby making going
private initiatives for small firms impracticable. More importantly, delisting
decisions could seriously damage a firm's reputation and cause financial
difficulty if it causes creditors to call in loans or downgrade the firm's credit
rating.
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Yet, despite some antipathy to corporate governance rules and
regulations, business leaders in the United States have started to accept
the Sarbanes-Oxley measures as an obligatory set of minimum
standards necessary to warrant business success and revenues on a
global scale. Firms are increasingly convinced that improving board
structures, financial transparency, and disclosure policies is imperative
to attract prospective investors. This conclusion is drawn from
interviews conducted with lawyers, business leaders, and other insiders
familiar with the compliance trends associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. The growing number of initial public offerings (IPOs) of
companies in the United States in 2010 seems to confirm this view.97
96 Confidentiality and anonymity arrangements prevent us to mention the
names of the interviewees. Relevant records are on file with the authors.
9 David Gelles & Tellis Demos, NYSE Woos Silicon Valley to Catch Next
Wave of Listings, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2011, 19:16),
http://www.ft.com/home/us (search "Financial Times" for "NYSE Woos
Silicon Valley Gelles"). The decision of CBaySystems Holdings to cancel its
AIM listing for NASDAQ is just another example that firms consider a
NASDAQ listing to be more beneficial in terms of (1) attracting additional
capital, (2) providing more liquidity to investors, and (3) improving the firm's
reputation. In addition, CBaySystems intends to change its corporate seat from
the British Virgin Islands to the State of Delaware. No consideration is given to
the stricter listing rules. See CBaySystems Holdings Limited, Notice of General
Meeting (on file with the authors).
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The number of IPOs more than doubled in 2010: there were 63 IPOs in
2009 and 154 IPOs in 2010.98 It is fair to say that, despite the increase
in the cost of entry due to Sarbanes-Oxley, U.S. financial markets again
offer an attractive exit strategy for founders and venture capital
investors.
The growing acceptance of Sarbanes-Oxley is arguably due to
the fact that it has become clear that the federal intervention in
corporate law has not affected Delaware's lawmaking supremacy and,
more importantly, that high-growth companies still have the option to
deviate from Delaware's enabling statute. 99 Consider the case of
Google: Google, Inc., a Delaware corporation, decided not to abide by
global trends towards one-share-one-vote structures,100 but instead to
extend the "Google way" of doing business to its corporate governance
framework.o'0 Founders, Sergey Brin and Larry Page, together with
Chairman/CEO, Eric Schmidt, own approximately 90 percent of the
outstanding class B shares, giving them 68% of the firm's total voting
rights while their economic interest is only approximately 20%.102 This
structure clearly deviates from the one-share-one-vote principle. Still,
Google's dual-class share structure may be considered good practice
during the growth stage of the company because it gives controlling
shareholders an incentive to monitor the firm closely and exposes the
98 Matt Kranz, IPO Market Showing Sign of Life as 2011 Looks
Promising, USA Today, January 26, 2011.
9 William B. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of
Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 619 (2006); see also Chief
Justice Myron T. Steele, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, 52 N.Y.
L. REv. 502 (2008).
100 See supra Section II.
1o' Bernard Girard, THE GOOGLE WAY: How ONE COMPANY IS
REVOLUTIONIZING MANAGEMENT As WE KNow IT (2009); see also Victor
Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures,
104 MICH, L. REv. 1581 (2006) (explaining that Google's unusual IPO structure
had a branding effect).
102 The Board of Directors of Google, Inc. has authorized two classes of
common stock, Class A and Class B. On December 31, 2009, there were 6
billion and 3 billion shares authorized respectively; additionally, there were
243,611,368 and 74,160,683 shares legally outstanding of Class A and Class B
common stock. The rights of the holders of Class A and Class B common stock
are identical, except with respect to voting. Each share of Class A common
stock is entitled to one vote per share. Each share of Class B common stock is
entitled to ten votes per share. Shares of Class B common stock may be
converted at any time at the option of the stockholder and automatically convert
upon sale or transfer to Class A common stock. See
http://investor.google.com/pdf/2009_google-annualreport.pdf.
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founders personally to the firm's public shareholders and other
stakeholders.'0 3 That is not to say that Google completely foregoes
corporate governance obligations. Google's board of directors
established corporate governance guidelines that provide a flexible
framework rather than binding obligations. The fact that Google ranks
30th on the Financial Times Global 500 largest companies of 2010
indicates that the "Google way" of corporate governance does not
necessarily have a detrimental effect on firm value.104
The U.S. approach to corporate governance primarily seeks to
ensure that companies disclose their organizational structure and
financial conditions to investors. With some exceptions, no substantive
and costly corporate governance requirements are imposed on listed
companies. We argue that flexible corporate law and governance
principles that create a low access level to financial markets are more
successful for high-growth companies in the long run. Certainly, at a
time of corporate scandals and economic stagnation, it is hard to make
the case that companies in jurisdictions with a flexible corporate
governance structure eventually outperform companies in countries
with strict and rigid corporate governance rules and regulations. Most
commentators explain that if Europe were to replicate the
entrepreneurial environment of the United States, it should give priority
to establishing high labor mobility and risk tolerance, a well-developed
stock market, and large, independent sources of venture-capital
funding.10 5 However, despite these arguments, the Google exemplar
seems to indicate that flexible and adaptable corporate governance
frameworks also play an important role in the development of high-
growth companies in Europe. 06 Certainly, the exemplar suggests that
103 Lemonjuice.biz, Corporate Governance Rating of Google, Inc.,
available at http://lemonjuice.biz/sites/default/files/Google%20Corporate
%20Governance.pdf (accessed on January 26, 2011). The same conclusions can
be drawn from Apple Inc.'s contract with Steve Jobs, which states that he is
entitled to receive a salary of one U.S. dollar per year. See Fleischer, supra note
101.
104 The Financial Times Global 500 ranking is based on market
capitalizations. The fact that the ranking contains a forward-looking element, as
share prices include a view of investors' expectations, makes it an interesting
study for comparisons of different corporate governance models.
105 McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 91.
106 William W. Bratton, Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P. M. Vermeulen,
How Does Corporate Mobility Affect Lawmaking? A Comparative Analysis, 57
AM. J. COMP. L. 347, 347-85 (2009). In strict regulation jurisdictions, such as
Germany and Austria, the Societas Europaea offers an alternative to companies
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the mandatory nature of European corporate law and its trend towards a
one-size-fits-all approach does not accommodate the flexible
governance needs of high-growth companies, which often stand out by
doing things differently.'07
B. EXEMPLAR 2: THE CASE FOR "RESPONSIBLE"
SHAREHOLDERS
The past few years have seen an exponential increase in the
rights of shareholders in listed firms.'08 One of the goals underlying
these changes is the idea that investors can be nudged into exercising
their corporate rights in order to counteract opportunism by insiders.
However, reforms undertaken in several jurisdictions have seemingly
failed to encourage a more hands-on approach by shareholders. This
failure is particularly worrisome in light of the increased operational
costs that enhanced investor rights generate for listed firms. The efforts
of policymakers to encourage "responsible behavior" by shareholders
may actually lead to adverse economic consequences.
Evidence gathered from participation in shareholder meetings
shows that investors are still reluctant to actively exercise their
improved rights. The general assembly of shareholders, which allows
shareholders to submit proposals and vote on the items included in the
agenda, is perhaps the most important mechanism through which
investors can make their voices heard. Despite the importance of
general assemblies for governance, policymakers have long struggled
to stimulate more active attendance and participation in these
meetings.'0 9 Our research indicates these efforts have not had the
coveted effect of significantly increasing attendance at these
shareholders meetings. To test whether improvements in the rights of
that need to circumvent the strict regulations. For instance, Mensch und
Machine Software SE, a high-tech company that focuses on Computer Aided
Design and Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) solutions employed the SE to
implement a one-tier board structure. This provided the founders with more
control and influence of the decision-making processes (compare the earlier
Google example).
107 Cf Guide to Starting a Corporation, Fenwick & West LLP (2009)
(stating that listed companies prefer Delaware General Corporation Law for its
flexibility and prestige).
los See supra Section III.B.
109 As explained above, these efforts flow from the belief that shareholder
participation can offset managerial opportunism and improve the performance
of listed firms.
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investors have any influence on the behavior of shareholders,
particularly with regard to their willingness to attend general
assemblies, we sampled turnout at meetings in Belgium, France,
Germany, and the U.K. between 2007 and 2010.110 Our research shows
that during this period the average attendance of shareholders slightly
increased from 55% to 58% overall. This increase was largely driven
by France and the U.K., where turnout increased from 53% to 61% and
from 59% to 65%, respectively. As shown in Figure 4, average
attendance rates remained unchanged in Germany and Belgium. Given
the effect of exogenous factors, including the recent financial crisis, the
evidence does not conclusively support any relationship between the
improvement in the rights of investors and turnout at general meetings
of shareholders."
We also tested the influence of shareholder rights by looking at
shareholder meeting attendance in a sample of twenty-one large
German firms between 1998 and 2010.112 According to the information
gathered in our sample, included in Figure 5, attendance at shareholder
110 In Belgium, France, and Germany we looked at available voting
turnout for all index-listed companies, BEL-20, CAC-40 and DAX-30. In the
U.K. we looked at twenty FTSE-100 companies with available voting turnouts.
1 See supra Section III.B.
112 This information was obtained from the Deutsche Schutzvereinigung
flir Wertpapierbesitz and is on file with the authors.
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meetings was at an all time high in 1998. On average, 59% of all shares
were represented at the general meetings of the firms included in our
sample during that year. By 2005, however, attendance had dropped to
45%. While there was a 5% increase in shareholder turnout in 2006 and
2007, this trend stopped by 2010. Crucially, these fluctuations do not
correspond with the developments in German corporate governance
over the past decade. In fact, shareholder turnout actually decreased
after the turn of the century, when the first corporate governance codes
were adopted in Germany (see also Figure 1). This does not support a
relationship between the improvement of investor rights and their
participation at shareholder meetings. However, other legislative
measures, such as the 2005 UMAG (Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegritdt
und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts) appear to have had a
positive impact on turnout. In fact, after this law introduced a record
date system and facilitated electronic proxy voting and voting in
absentia, commentators reported significant increases in shareholder
attendance to general meetings." 3 Still, this appears to have been a
temporary phenomenon as turnout decreased toward the end our
sample, even though further corporate governance measures were
enacted."14
113 Ulrich Noack & Dirk A. Zetzsche, Germany's Corporate and
Financial Law 2007: (Getting) Ready for Competition 32 (Ctr. for Bus. &
Corp. Law, Working Paper No. 0028, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=986357.
114 In 2009, the VorstAG - Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der
Vorstandsvergfltung granted shareholders a shareholder vote on remuneration
policies. According to our research 90% of all DAX companies provided the
item on the agenda of the 2010 general meeting. In two companies, one of
which was a bank, serious opposition was expressed and the policy was
approved by majorities between 50% and 60%. In one company, which was hit
hard by the financial crisis, the majority of shareholder turned the policy down.
All the other companies had their remuneration policies approved by
overwhelming majorities. Earlier legislative initiatives such as NaStraG -
Gesetz zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausfibung
NamensAktiengesetz (2001) - and TransPuG - Transparenz- und
Publizitatsgesetz (2002) - also provided more rights for shareholders and
general meetings, but this is not reflected in the data of the attendance of
shareholders at general meetings.
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It turns out that the behavior of shareholders that actually attend
general meetings does not support the conclusion that enhancing
investor rights compels them to behave more "responsibly." A 2008
study on voting trends in large European firms showed that most
resolutions presented at general meetings were approved with an
overwhelming majority of more than 90% of attending shareholders. 115
As shown in Table 4, we have complemented this study with data
gathered from four European firms during 2010, which shows a similar
picture. In fact, opposition to the resolutions brought before the general
assembly of shareholders in these companies was not substantial. This
may suggest that proposals brought before the shareholders of these
firms are uncontroversial, which might in turn indicate that these firms
are exceptionally well-managed. Nonetheless, the evidence could also
suggest that, despite the ongoing improvements in the rights of
investors, shareholders are still hesitant when it comes to actually
exercising these prerogatives.
115 The average approval ratio lies between 92% in Germany and 98% in
Spain. All items on all agendas were approved by overwhelming majorities:
45% of the items with more than 99% of the votes; 39% of the items with more
than 95% of the votes; and 10% with more than 90% of the votes. Furthermore,
only 35% of the agenda items were opposed by 10% to 20% of the votes, and
only 2% of the items were opposed by more than 20%. One item on the agenda
of Air Liquide was opposed by 36% of the attending votes.
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Table 4: Agenda items discussed in four European firms
Agenda item Vodafone Siemens Air Liquide General




















transaction (board and x
senior management)









in own shares x
purchase own shares x* x
purchase own shares
via equity derivatives x
annulment of shares x*
authorization to issue
convertible bonds x
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Agenda item Vodafone Siemens Air Liquide General
(UK) (G) (FR) Electric (US)










capital increase via x*
retained benefits
authorization for
capital increase via *
beneficiaries of savings x
plan
authorization for






equity instruments in x*
case of takeover bid
authorization of power
to execute AGM x
decisions
Total items (election 12 13 16 2
considered as 1 item)
shareholder proposals 2 (rejected) 6 (rejected)
notice of the meeting
(pages) provided to 16 100 28 press release
shareholders
x: item voted; p: informative item; * extra-ordinary part of combined meeting
(FR) or special resolutions (UK)
By looking at the results presented in this Section, we have not
been able to find conclusive evidence to support the existence of a
strong relationship between corporate governance reforms and
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responsible shareholder behavior in Europe. In other words, the efforts
deployed by policymakers during the last decade may not have had the
desired effect. The problem is that these reform programs impose
additional costs on listed companies arising from more paperwork and
higher administrative expenses, which are necessary to comply with an
increasingly tangled web of rules." 6 This may create a hostile
environment for firms in the European Union.
C. THE ROLE OF REPUTATION IN LISTED FIRMS
In both developed and emerging countries, the reputation of
controlling shareholders-outside expectations of their future
behavior-can have a large affect on the firm's economic outlook." 7
As the firm's trading counterparties observe the actions of controlling
shareholders, they will readjust the conditions under which they deal
with the firm to match the expected behavior of these insiders."' This
readjustment can increase or decrease the firm's cost of trading in
product and capital markets. In product markets these costs are mainly
represented by the firm's trading volumes, its commercial
opportunities, and its need to provide executable guarantees or costly
bonding mechanisms." 9 In capital markets, the readjustment of trading
conditions can affect the firm's cost of capital, since outside
expectations concerning the behavior of insiders leads investors to
increase or discount the price paid for shares.
116 In a typical European corporation, for instance, the notice required to
call a meeting of the shareholders can take up to one hundred pages, including
all the required preparatory material.
117 For discussions on the importance of reputation in the field of
corporate law, see John Armour et al., Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational
Damage in Financial Markets (Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No.
62/2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=
1678028; Jonathan Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43
J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 581 (2008); Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J.
Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China's Securities Market, 108 COLUM. L.
REv. 929 (2008); Cindy Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty
for Corporate Crime: Evidence Penalties: Public and Private, 42 J. LAw EcON.
489 (1999).
118 John Armour, Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A
Roadmap and Empirical Assessment (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. - Law,
Working Paper No. 106/2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfn?abstract _id=1133542.
"9 Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing
Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REv. 633 (2007).
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When insiders have no established reputation or are known to
renege on their obligations, the firm will have high trading costs.
Conversely, a firm with an insider renowned for fair dealing will reap
financial benefits through a reduction in its trading costs in product and
capital markets. These effects, positive and negative, feed back to
majority equity shareholders and their prospects for private benefit
extraction. All value flowing from the firm to these insiders is
ultimately tied to the company's economic performance. If the firm's
financial situation deteriorates due to increased trading costs, insiders
will bear most of the resulting losses through lower dividends and
reduced benefit extraction. The same is true for monetary gains tied to
reductions in the firm's trading costs that redound to the benefit of
controlling shareholders.120
As this system of reputation-based trading is tied to the expected
actions of insiders, these parties act as reputational intermediaries
between the firm and its counterparties.1 21 This role can be significant
in certain settings. In corporate groups, for instance, the financial
effects of reputation have the potential to spread across several firms
under the control of a single shareholder. This follows naturally when
outsiders rely on the actions of an insider in one firm as a proxy for her
behavior in conducting the affairs of other firms within the same
group.122 Reputation is also valuable in family firms, as their
controlling parties often have a specific interest in securing trans-
generational wealth.123 The succession process between founders and
heirs extends the number of potential interactions between controlling
shareholders, in their capacity as reputational intermediaries, and the
firm's counterparties, which boosts the positive or negative financial
effects of reputation-based trading. Finally, highly-visible controlling
parties are also proficient bearers of reputation. Entrepreneurs
120 Jose M. Mendoza, The Untapped Potential of Alternative Markets, 6
CAPITAL MARKETs L. J. (forthcoming 2011).
121 Armour, supra note 118.
122 The "transmission" of reputation would reach listed firms within the
group, as well as unlisted affiliates trading in local product markets. This would
have a multiplying effect on the financial gains or losses tied to the variations
in the costs of trading for all firms within a single group.
123 On the interest of family firms to preserve trans-generational wealth,
see Timothy G. Habbershon & Joseph Pistrui, Enterprising Families Domain:
Family-Influenced Groups in Pursuit of Transgenerational Wealth, 15 FAMILY
Bus. REv. 223 (2002); Andrew Ellul, Control Motivations and Capital Structure
Decision, (Jan. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract- 1094997.
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renowned for their sound business acumen or, conversely, notorious for
unfair dealing will have a direct effect on the firm's cost of trading. 124
Consequently, reputation-based trading can have a significant
impact on the financial prospects of listed firms. This creates incentives
for the controlling shareholders of these firms to bolster their
reputational capital, which may ultimately redound to the benefit of
minority investors.125 However, the overproduction of mandatory rules
can have a negative effect on the ability of these parties to leverage
reputation to their advantage. As a country's legal framework is
saturated with corporate governance rules, the effect of reputation is
diminished. Market participants may in fact be more inclined to rely on
objective measures (i.e. compliance with codes of best practice) when
negotiating dealings with the firm, rather than on the reputation of its
controlling parties. This may crowd out the positive effects tied to the
reputational incentives of the firm's majority shareholders.126 The
problem with this lies with the notion that, as discussed above,
adherence to rigid corporate governance rules is not always a true
indicator of whether the firm is being run properly. Accordingly, the
effect of these rules may be to replace a mechanism that can effectively
increase overall welfare with a system that may not.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURES
If we accept the idea that a flexible and adaptable governance
structure could enhance welfare by promoting best practices that most
firms prefer, then the task of policymakers and lawmakers is to create
institutions that contribute to the production of acceptable minimum
standards of corporate governance. The work of standard-setting
institutions, such as the Delaware legislature and corporate governance
committees, is successful if they produce legal standards and best
124 Compare the Google-example in Section IV.A.
125 The loss of reputation can act as a constraint on the appropriation of
firm value by controlling shareholders. Observed misbehavior or unfair
dealings towards the firm's counterparties can prompt the latter to change the
conditions under which they will deal with the firm in the future. This will most
severely impact controlling parties, who will see a reduction in the overall
wealth they derive from the firm. Gains in reputation can also encourage value-
maximizing behavior, as controlling shareholders that cultivate a reputation for
sound management and fair dealing can benefit from improvements in the
firm's performance through reductions in its costs of trading. See Mendoza,
supra note 120.
126 Vermeulen, supra note 53.
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practices that meet firms' needs, while adopting provisions that reflect
the ever-changing environment in which firms operate. The process
also serves to limit the effects of lock-in obsolescence when the
standard-setting institutions are engaged in continuous revision of the
corporate governance model against the background of changing
market conditions. The implementation of the Takeover Bids Directive,
discussed in Section Two, led to an apparent consensus about the
behavior of companies in a takeover situation. Corporate governance
codes that emerged in Europe certainly have the potential to add to the
standard-setting process of corporate governance best practices in
member states. However, due to the mandatory nature of these codes,
corporate governance committees should be careful not to introduce
overly rigid rules. Fiduciary duties, such as the duty of loyalty,
arguably prove more effective in protecting minority shareholders and
other stakeholders. Such a fiduciary duty could be viewed as a backstop
mechanism that makes the application of the corporate governance
framework contingent on circumstances verifiable by an adjudicator ex
post, but prohibitively costly to identify ex ante.
In a business environment in which corporate governance issues
are increasingly debated, judges are not only important to enforce
corporate governance mechanisms, but also to develop them through
the common law. In this respect, the role of the judiciary appears to be
conducive for the development of an effective corporate governance
framework.127 Notwithstanding the stare decisis doctrine, which may
impede innovative corporate governance approaches, judges can
respond faster and more easily to economic and social change than
lawmakers or regulatory institutions. 128 Courts continuously develop
innovative interpretations and clarifications of the existing corporate
governance rules and principles.129 Obviously, the downside of judicial
involvement is litigation costs (see Figure 6) and uncertainty with
respect to the outcome. The common view is that judicial intervention
is costly, time-consuming and, more importantly, prone to error due to
the fact that conflicts in the business sphere are often difficult to
observe by general courts ex post. This might be different for
specialized business courts, which are characterized by the following
six key factors: integrity and speed; business experience; level of
127 Erik P. M. Vermeulen & Dirk A. Zetzsche, The Use and Abuse of
Investor Suits, An Inquiry into the Dark Side of Shareholder Activism, 7 EUR.
COMPANY & FIN. L. REv. 1, 13 (2010).
128 La Porta et al., supra note 1.
129 Steele, supra note 99.
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deference to insiders (which should be low); ability to focus on key
issues; the degree of formalism in its decisions (which should also be
low); and the concern it has for the effect of its decisions on other
corporate actors.130 Aside from these specialized venues, it appears that
very few courts are able to respond effectively to business conflicts.' 3'




An example of a specialized corporate court that often bases its
decisions on clarifications of fiduciary duties is the Delaware Court of
Chancery. 132 In Europe, there is also at least one specialized business
130 Luca Enriques, Do Corporate Law Judges Matter? Some Evidence
from Milan, in THE QUALITY OF CORPORATE LAW AND THE ROLE OF CORPORATE
LAW JUDGES (Louis Bouchez et al. eds., 2006). See also Jack J. Jacobs, The
Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Corporate Governance Disputes in the
United States and in the EU, in THE QUALITY OF CORPORATE LAW AND THE
ROLE OF CORPORATE LAW JUDGES (Louis Bouchez et al. eds., 2006).
131 Louis Bouchez & Alexander Karpf, The OECD's Work Programme on
Corporate Governance and Dispute Resolution, in THE QUALITY OF
CORPORATE LAW AND THE ROLE OF CORPORATE LAW JUDGES (Louis Bouchez et
al. eds., 2006).
132 Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 CINCINNATI L. REv. 1061 (2000).
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court: The Enterprise Chamber, a division of the Amsterdam Court of
Appeals. Similar to Delaware's court, it provides parties with a speedy,
predictable, and low-cost procedure for obtaining relief from
governance conflicts. Through the possibility to order temporary
measures in its Inquiry Proceeding (see Figure 7), shareholders benefit
from the fast decision-making process of the Chamber.' 33 During the
period 2002-2008, the average number of days elapsed before a
temporary measure was granted was five days for listed companies and
seventy-two days for non-listed companies. The difference between the
listed and non-listed companies is arguably due to the amount of media
attention and greater pressure that can be exerted by the institutional
investors involved. Still, the level of deference to insiders, with regard
to claims, is relatively low. Empirical evidence shows that most inquiry
procedures are heavily tilted against the interests of controlling
parties.' 34
133 Dutch company law mandates that only a narrow range of individuals
are entitled to request an inquiry procedure. Besides the public prosecutor (for
reasons of public interest) and trade unions (for employees' interests), the most
important constituency allowed to request an inquiry procedure are
shareholders (or depository receipt holders) who alone or collectively own at
least 10% of the outstanding shares or depository receipts of a company or
shares with a nominal value of EUR 225,000, or such lesser amount as is
provided by the articles of association. See Book 2 BW Articles 344-359
(Burgerlijk Wetboek - Dutch Civil Code).
134 Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Conflict Resolution and
the Role of Courts: An Empirical Study, in COMPANY LAW AND SMEs, 207
(Mette Neville & Karsten Engsig Sorensen eds., 2010).
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Because the Enterprise Chamber usually relies on the fiduciary
duty of "reasonableness and fairness," it is highly flexible in its use of
remedies and procedures. 3 5 Moreover, the Enterprise Chamber has full
discretion to order any temporary measure as it sees fit. The Enterprise
Chamber typically uses three measures for listed companies: (1)
appointment of independent board members, (2) the prohibition of
voting on particular agenda items, and (3) deviation from the articles of
association. 3 This list shows that the Inquiry Proceeding is not limited
to mere after-the-fact adjudication, but it offers conflicting parties-
through its possibility to order non-formalistic temporary measures-an
additional, low-cost, round of after-the-fact bargaining, either by
themselves or under the supervision of independent observers.'37 A fast
'3s See Book 2 BW Article 8 (Burgerlijk Wetboek - Dutch Civil Code)
(stating that shareholders and managers should conduct themselves in relation
to each other in accordance with the dictates of reasonableness and fairness).
13 The list is derived from our dataset including both listed and non-listed
companies that were not involved in bankruptcy proceedings. In the period
2002-2008, the Enterprise Chamber granted more than 130 temporary
measures.
In Vermeulen, supra note 53.
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and informal "judge-initiated" mediation or conciliation procedure is a
very attractive corporate governance mechanism.
Some jurisdictions have attempted to address the shortcomings of
their local judiciaries by delegating enforcement to public agencies or
other independent bodies.' 3  This solution has been particularly
effective where adjudicating experts specialize in corporate affairs.140
Nonetheless, adjudication of this nature often faces certain hurdles.
Public officers often lack sufficient incentives to discipline
misbehavior. In some cases, political pressure from influential insiders
can neutralize prospective inquiries. 141 Scarcity of funds or of qualified
personnel can further aggravate the situation. 142
What can policymakers and lawmakers in Europe learn from
this? The contemporary economic crisis has set the regulatory train in
motion. Corporate governance frameworks tend to become increasingly
detailed and rigid. The rules and regulations that were introduced in the
wake of the scandals at the beginning of the century arguably set
minimum standards of corporate governance that were needed to offer
listed companies a more effective checks-and-balances system. Instead
of pursuing a one-size-fits-all approach, policymakers should focus on
introducing an open-ended duty of loyalty, along with the possibility to
bring claims before a specialized court. Experiences in the United
States and the Netherlands indicate that shareholders and other
stakeholders in a listed company would in fact prefer low-cost
specialized business court proceedings that enable them to solve their
governance problems in a more informal setting.1
43
138 Leo E. Strine, Jr., "Mediation-Only" Filings in the Delaware Court of
Chancery: Can New Value Be Added by One of America's Business Courts?,
53 DuKE L.J. 585 (2003).
139 This is certainly the case in Latin American countries such as Mexico,
Chile, Brazil, and Colombia, all of which rely heavily on administrative
enforcement by public agencies to discipline market players.
140 Strine, supra note 138.
141 A notorious example of this trend may perhaps be found in Italy, where
the controlling heads of large conglomerates wield significant political power.
See Luca Enriques, Modernizing Italy's Corporate Governance Institutions:
Mission Accomplished?, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. - Law, Working Paper
No. 123/2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1400999.
142 Gilson, supra note 119.
143 Jacobs, supra note 130 (arguing that the Delaware Court of Chancery
and the Dutch Enterprise Chamber serve as models for a specialized business
court at a European level).
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V. CONCLUSION
This paper challenges the current trend towards more detailed
regulation in the field of European corporate governance. For a variety
of reasons, policymakers have been actively discussing the introduction
of measures to further regulate the activities of listed firms. Some
examples of this trend include the rules and regulations meant to
promote the involvement of independent directors and long-term
shareholders in the decision-making process of firms. In addition,
certain policymakers have argued that changing the composition and
compensation of corporate boards will deter fraud and abuse in the
boardroom and, at the same time, foster firm performance. This paper
casts doubt on the effectiveness of these regulatory trends as they
arguably generate considerable costs for listed firms in Europe.
Supported by three exemplars, we argue against imposing one-size-fits-
all rules on listed firm governance. Our analysis supports the need to
implement regulatory configurations tailored to meet the diverse needs
of companies and changing economic conditions. Specifically, we
argue in favor of minimum corporate governance standards and more
flexibility for courts. To this end, perhaps policymakers should
consider a framework for introducing a business court at the European
level specializing in corporate governance and conflict resolution.
These measures, which are meant to boost the potential of high-growth
firms, may move Europe closer to its long-held ambition of becoming
the most competitive economy in the world.
